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CHAPTER 13 
Zoning and Land Use 
RICHARD G. HUBER 
A. DECISIONS 
§13.I. Zoning: Variances. Perhaps an educator's two most im-
portant abilities are patience with his pupils and persistence in reiter-
ating doctrine and principles. The Supreme Judicial Court admirably 
performed its educational function in a number of land use cases de-
cided during the 1960 SURVEY year. The restrictions of the Zoning 
Enabling Actl were again spelled out in a form sufficiently simple for 
even the most obtuse to see, if they but will. 
The Supreme Judicial Court decided two variance cases during the 
1960 SURVEY year, in both of which they found that local boards of 
appeals had exceeded their powers. In Cary v. Board of Appeals of 
W orcesterZ a variance was sought to use a lot in a residence zone as a 
parking area for a supermarket built on adjacent, business-zoned prop-
erty. The decision of the local board of appeals granting the variance 
was sustained by the Superior Court in a well-detailed and reasoned 
statement of findings and rulings.3 Hardship was found because the 
lot involved could not be used for residential purposes.4 The variance, 
since if granted it would relieve heavy traffic congestion, was held to 
provide a positive public advantage, so no problem of substantial detri-
ment to the public good arose. Since the Superior Court found as facts 
that the market value of five homes adjacent to the proposed parking 
lot would be reduced and that noise from the lot would affect these 
properties for about twelve hours each day, it had a difficult question 
in determining whether the statutory requirement that the variance not 
RICHARD G. HUBER is Professor of Law at Boston College Law School and Editor 
in Chief of the ANNUAL SURVEY. 
The author wishes to thank Sheila M. McCue of the Board of Student Editors of 
the ANNUAL SURVEY for research assistance in the preparation of this chapter. 
§13.1. 1 G.L., c. 40A. 
2340 Mass. 748, 166 N.E.2d 690 (1960). 
3 See Record, pp. 4-23. 
4 As both the Superior Court and the Supreme Judicial Court pointed out, the 
unavailability of this lot for residential purposes was caused by the owners, who had 
separated it from a larger plot and then used the other portion for a parking area 
for their supermarket. The present locus thus fronts on no street or way, its only 
access being through the parking lot. 340 Mass. 748, 750, 166 N.E.2d 690, 691 (1960); 
Record, pp. 14-15. 
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substantially derogate from the purpose of the zoning ordinance had 
been met. The final determination that the test was met was based 
upon a balancing of two authorized purposes of zoning: the public 
advantage of lessening congestion in the streets against the loss of value 
of the land and buildings of the adjacent landowners.5 
The decision of the Superior Court was reversed by the Supreme 
Judicial Court. The Court did not decide the issue of whether hard-
ship was proven, admitting that it was a difficult problem on the facts.6 
It agreed with the lower court that public good was in no way ad-
versely affected, but it found that the variance would substantially 
derogate from the purpose of the zoning ordinance. The loss of the 
nearby landowners was considerable, as found as a fact by the Superior 
Court,7 and the public advantage of relief from traffic congestion could 
not be balanced against this private loss, as the lower court had done. 
The Supreme Judicial Court pointed out that the process of balancing 
private property rights and public advantage is proper in connection 
with the enactment of zoning laws but it is not, except in a very limited 
sense, pertinent in determining if a variance meets the rigid and strict 
requirements of the statute. The opinion thus seems to indicate that, 
if anyone of the ten statutory reasons for zoning is substantially dero-
gated by the proposed variance,s the mere fact that one or more of the 
other statutory reasons is enhanced or furthered will not permit a find-
ing of no substantial derogation of the zoning purpose; each purpose 
of the zoning law must be tested separately and substantial derogation 
of anyone will prevent the granting of a variance. 
In Stark v. Board of Appeals of Quincy9 the Supreme Judicial Court 
found that not even one of the statutory requirements for the granting 
of a variance had been met and thus agreed with the Superior Court in 
finding that the local board of appeals had exceeded its authority.1° 
The landowners had sought a variance to permit a previously existing 
but unauthorized business use of property located in a residence zone. 
The board of appeals granted the variance, apparently on the theory 
5 Record, pp. 20·22. These two statutory purposes of zoning, among others, are 
set out in G.L., c. 40A, §3. 
6 The Court's discussion indicates that hardship would have to be determined not 
just as to the present locus but as to the entire property as it was at the time the 
supermarket first purchased it; thus, the present lack of access would not be in direct 
issue. The Court noted, however, that there was a factual basis for a finding that 
the entire property, even as it existed at the time of purchase, was subject to condi· 
tions especially affecting it and not affecting the zoning district generally. 340 Mass. 
748,751,166 N.E.2d 690, 691 (1960). 
7 Record, pp. 20·21. 
S G.L., c. 40A, §3, lists ten "reasons for regulation" but indicates that even these 
purposes are not exclusive. Thus, at least in some factual situations, a zoning law 
could have a purpose beyond the ten specifically listed in the section. 
91960 Mass. Adv. Sh. 817,167 N.E.2d 611. 
10 The Superior Court found that the variance would be detrimental to the public 
good and substantially derogate from the intent of the zoning ordinance. The Su-
preme Judicial Court, concurring in these findings, also found that there were no 
conditions especially affecting this locus and not the zoning district generally, which 
would prevent a finding of hardship to the landowner. 
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that business use of this building involved was a nonconforming use; 
since the building was not even constructed when the zoning ordinance 
was adopted, this finding could not be supported. 
§13.2. Zoning: Nonconforming uses. When a zoning law is en-
acted, those uses that exist at the time of adoption may continue, even 
if the zone requirements do not permit them, as nonconforming uses.1 
The enabling act permits zoning regulations to be applied to this use 
only after a period of non-user.2 The nonconforming use, however, 
may change in nature because technological developments may alter 
operations in a commercial or industrial field, or because business ex-
pansion may change the essential nature of the use. This problem was 
faced by the Supreme Judicial Court in 1959 in Town of Seekonk v. 
Anthony,S and resolved by requiring that a nonconforming use remain 
essentially the same in character as it was when the zoning was adopted. 
In Anthony this prevented the use on the land of the technical advances 
made in the cement industry and consequently made the entire opera-
tion commercially obsolescent. This same general problem was in 
issue in Town of Wellesley v. Brossi,4 decided during the 1960 SURVEY 
year. When the zoning by-law was adopted the owner was in the part-
time masonry business, had a small tool shed on the land, and stored 
small amounts of building materials and lumber thereon. The land 
was in a general residence zone and could not be used for commercial 
or business purposes. The owner's business eventually changed into a 
full-time masonry business with some operations in the general con-
struction field. The Court found that this constituted a change in the 
character and purpose of the use, although this change was not so 
marked as that involved in the Anthony case. The use was therefore 
limited to that storage that existed when the by-law was adopted. 
The Court's decision in the Brossi case is certainly one that will be 
debated. The difference in character between a part-time masonry 
business and one that operates full-time and includes some construction 
is not a great one, even if the businesses were being conducted openly 
from the land, with signs, offices, storage of materials and supplies, and 
customers visiting the premises. And, in this case, the land use change 
was much less than the character change in the business might suggest, 
since there were no offices, no signs or other advertising, and no cus-
tomers coming upon the land. The difference in use was primarily 
in the amount and nature of the items stored upon the land. If non-
conforming uses are to be removed eventually, however, what some may 
consider the hypertechnicality of the Court's view of what constitutes a 
change in character of use is the only acceptable standard to apply. 
The effect of the Court's standard applied to Brossi is not harsh, since 
it merely requires the storage elsewhere of two trucks, some staging, 
§13.2. 1 G.L., c. 40A, §5. 
2 Ibid. 
S 339 Mass. 49, 157 N .E.2d. 651 (1959), commented on in 1959 Ann. Surv. Mass. 
Law §12.2. 
4340 Mass. 456, 164 N .E.2d 883 (1960). 
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building material and lumber, and a few tools of a type not used by 
a part-time mason operating alone. This may be inconvenient to the 
landowner but does not deprive him of his business and does prevent 
gradual and increased encroachment of commerce into a residential 
zone. 
The destruction by non-user of a nonconforming use was before the 
Supreme Judicial Court in Dobbs v. Board of Appeals of Northamp-
ton.5 Property located in a residence district was used, when zoning 
was adopted, as a grocery store and later as a farm implement store. 
This commercial use continued until May 1954, although the building 
was used to store farm implements for an additional year. The owners 
were unable to lease the property for business purposes from May 1955 
until early 1958, when they found a tenant who would lease it for a 
single-operator beauty shop, if the use would be permitted. The own-
ers sought permission for a change in nonconforming use on the basis 
of the local zoning ordinance, which provides: "Any non-conforming 
use may be changed to another non-conforming use or any non-con-
forming building may be rebuilt or repaired on permit from the board 
of appeals, such new use or reconstructed building not to be substan-
tially different in character or objectionable to the neighborhood." 
The Superior Court annulled the decision of the board of appeals 
granting the permit, holding that the nonconforming use ceased in May 
of 1954 and the two-year period of non-user provided for in the ordi-
nance prevented any present use of the property except in accordance 
with the zone use regulations. 
In previous cases the Supreme Judicial Court has held that non-
occupancy does not of itself constitute non-user; the question of non-
user is one to be determined by evidence of abandonment of the use, 
determined from the intent of the landowner accompanied by volun-
tary conduct carrying that intent into effect.6 When, as in the Dobbs 
case, reasonable effort has been made to rent the property, no intent 
to abandon the commercial use can be inferred. The Court therefore 
disagreed with the Superior Court and found that the landowners had 
not, by non-user, lost their right to use this property for a store. It up-
held the decision of the Superior Court, however, since beauty shops, 
which are service businesses, and grocery and implement stores, which 
are mercantile operations, are, under the local zoning ordinance quoted 
above, "substantially different in character." Thus, the proposed 
change in nonconforming use was not permitted, although the close-
ness of the nature of service and merchandise businesses might, to a 
casual observer, suggest that they are not substantially different. 
The Supreme Judicial Court correctly interprets the non-user pro-
vision of the enabling act to require an intentional ending of a non-
conforming use. The General Court might very well consider, how-
ever, amending the act to permit a municipality to end a nonconform-
5339 Mass. 684, 162 N.E.2d 32 (1959). 
6 Pioneer Insulation & Modernizing Corp. v. City of Lynn, 331 Mass. 560, 564-565, 
120 N.E.2d 913, 916 (1954), and cases cited. 
4
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ing use when the use itself, without regard to the owner's intent, has 
not been exercised for some period, possibly five years. Constitutional 
objections to this amendment should not be insurmountable and the 
provision would gradually eliminate nonconforming uses, particularly 
those uses, as in the Dobbs case, that are obviously economically mar-
ginal and thus likely to constitute a source of blight. 
§13.3. Zoning: Unconstitutional application of local zoning law. 
In two cases decided by the Supreme Judicial Court during the 1960 
SURVEY year, zoning regulations relating. to access were held to be 
applied unconstitutionally to the specific property involved. In Gem 
Properties, Inc. v. Board of Appeals of Milton,! two lots of a subdivision 
were not located on any street but a way had been laid out in the ap-
proved subdivision plan over adjoining lots, and conveyances of these 
later lots were made subject to the easement of way. No other access 
to these two back lots was possible since they were abutted on all other 
sides by a town cemetery. Some four years after the lots subject to the 
easement had been conveyed and the subdivision plan had been ap-
proved, the town amended its definition of "frontage" in its zoning 
law to require measurement along a street line, whereas prior to that 
time frontage of a lot not located on a street could be determined by the 
length of the lot's front line. "Street" wall defined in the zoning by· 
law to include "private ways ... plotted for ultimate public use," 
but the Court expressed doubt if this ambiguous definition would cover 
a way appurtenant to the back lots. The Court held that the town 
could not, however, prevent the owner from building on these lots 
because the application of the new frontage requirements to these 
lots would deprive the owner of his rights in the property without, in 
turn, benefiting the public in any way. In determining the validity 
of zoning laws the Court balances public benefit against loss of private 
property rights.2 In some cases this may be a difficult balance to make 
but in a situation in which no public benefit could accrue, making 
these two large lots un buildable could not be justified. 
Jenckes v. Building Commissioner of Brookline3 was similar to the 
Gem Properties case. The town of Brookline prohibits the construc-
tion of buildings on established private ways of less than forty-foot 
width. The property involved was located on a private way of ap-
proximately thirty-foot width. No other question of zoning by-law, 
compliance was involved. The private way had been in existence 
some fifty years and some eleven lots were completely built up, this 
property and one other large lot being the only ones without homes 
thereon. The Court found that the public benefit of the zoning re-
striction was very trivial, despite the town's argument that it was 
necessary as a safety measure and particularly for fire equipment ac-
cess, even though it perhaps might be appropriately applied to land 
§13.3. 11960 Mass. Adv. Sh. 771,167 N.E.2d 315. 
2 Barney Be Carey Co. v. Town of Milton, 324 Mass. 440, 444-450, 87 N.E.2d 9, 
13-15 (1949). 
31960 Mass. Adv. Sh. 867, 167 N.E.2d 757. 
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largely undeveloped. But the Court found its application on these 
facts unconstitutional since it resulted only in the inability of one 
owner to build where others have already built, no greater public 
danger would be involved in permitting this one additional home, and 
thus the owner of the property was permitted to do more than "merely 
to look at it and pay taxes on it." 4 
Land use regulations, particularly zoning laws, apply to land that 
has often been in use for over three centuries. While planners and 
local legislators tend to plan and legislate for an ideal scheme of land 
use, this ideal scheme often conflicts with established property rights. 
These private property rights cannot be ignored and can be over-
ridden only when· public interests require. In a sense, this constitu-
tional requirement represents the reverse of the old maxim about 
closing the barn door after the horse is stolen; undeveloped or slightly 
developed land can be subjected to considerably greater restriction 
than developed neighborhoods can, and thus the ones whose property 
use may most conflict with the master plan can insist that their es-
tablished rights to have the barn door kept open be respected. 
§13.4. Zoning: Spot zoning. Once a zoning plan has been en-
acted into law, changes in zone boundaries can be made only when 
the character of use of the rezoned area has changed.! This require-
ment of uniform classification was found to have been violated in 
Shapiro v. City of Cambridge)2 decided during the 1960 SURVEY year. 
The city had, in 1943, zoned almost all land adjacent to the Boston 
and Maine Railroad tracks, which extend through the city for a 
considerable distance, for heavy industrial uses. The locus in the 
present action was part of this zone, although contiguous to a play-
ground alongside the tracks, that was zoned for residential purposes, 
and other residence zones. In 1957, one large lot in the locus was 
purchased by a building and wrecking business after a fire destroyed 
a cement storage business thereon. The owners of property in con-
tiguous residential districts feared that the new owner would use the 
property for a "junk yard" and sought an amendment of the zoning 
law affecting the locus, of which the large lot was a substantial part, 
changing it from heavy to light industrial use. The amendment was 
enacted, for the stated reason, among others, that the nearby residen-
tial districts had been substantially upgraded since the adoption of 
the zoning ordinance. The Supreme Judicial Court decided that it 
did not have to determine if these changes in nearby districts were 
sufficient to permit the change in classification of the locus,3 since the 
41960 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 870,167 N.E.2d at 759. 
§13.4. 1 Tracy v. Board of Appeals of Marblehead, 339 Mass. 205, 208, 158 N .E.2d 
317, 319-320 (1959), discussed in 1959 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §12.6; Leahy v. 
Inspector of Buildings of New Bedford, 308 Mass. 128, 132-133, 31 N.E.2d 436, 438-
439 (1941). 
2340 Mass. 652,166 N.E.2d 208 (1960). 
3 See the discussion of this issue in §13.3 supra, which involves the unconstitu-
tional application of zoning laws to the property of one owner. This problem is, of 
course, closely related to the issue of spot zoning. 
6
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new classification constituted spot zoning. Other land zoned for 
heavy industry was substantially similar to the locus and, similarly, 
adjoined residence zones that had been substantially upgraded since 
1943. The fact that one large lot in the locus had ceased to be used 
for a cement storage business did not change the character of the area. 
In addition, the Court stated: 
But where, as here, almost all the nearby industrially zoned 
land is in use, a change of zone will, except for the single vacant 
parcel, have an effect only gradually, and the appropriate area for 
rezoning is all that which for the same reason is differentiated 
from the rest of the zone having in mind not only the conditions 
within the zone, but also important changes in relationship to 
adjacent zones of other classification.4 
While the Shapiro case represents an opinion of only a majority of 
the Court, it seems to be correctly decided. Certainly the facts that 
the cement storage business had ceased to exist and all other land 
uses in the locus were light industrial, commercial, or residential,5 sug-
gest the desirability of rezoning to avoid uses more detrimental to 
surrounding areas than those already in existence. The motive for the 
change is not pertinent as long as the change is otherwise valid. The 
fact that nearly all property alongside the railroad trackage is zoned 
for heavy industry suggests that land for this use is overzoned for 
present and prospective use. These factors, however, seem not so much 
to suggest that the present rezoning of a small area should be permitted 
but that the city requires an overhaul of its zoning to consider changed 
land use, upgrading of districts, and present and prospective require-
ments of land use for given purposes. 
§13.5. Zoning: Permitted uses. Six cases decided by the Supreme 
Judicial Court during the 1960 SURVEY year decide whether a given 
use is permissible under the language of the applicable zoning law. 
Some arose in an accessory use context or in the context of an ex-
ception, but all are appropriately discussed in terms of interpretation 
of use limitations in the local zoning laws. 
Seaman v. Board of Appeals of Holliston l determined that a realtor 
was not permitted to use his home, located in a residence district, for 
his business. The Supreme Judicial Court decided that the realty 
business is not "a customary home occupation" nor the "practice of 
a profession" under the local zoning by-law permitting these uses of 
residentially zoned land. The Court warned that it was supporting a 
decision of the local board of appeals that the realty business was not 
a customary home occupation in that town, and that its decision was 
4340 Mass. 652, 658,166 N.E.2d 208, 212 (1960). 
I) From the information available, it appears that an automobile body shop in the 
locus would be either a light industrial or commercial use; other uses were clearly 
not heavy industrial. 
§13.5. 1 340 Mass. 488, 165 N .E.2d 97 (1960). 
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not meant to suggest that this business could not be a home occupation 
in other municipalities. 
Williams v. Inspector of Buildings of Belmont2 decided that a tennis 
court could be built on land zoned for single residences. The local 
zoning by-law regulated only buildings and structures on residentially 
zoned land, and the Supreme Judicial Court held it would not stretch 
the term "structure" to include a tennis court. It noted that even if 
it were willing to call a tennis court a "structure," evidence indicated 
that other tennis courts had been built adjacent to private homes in 
the town; thus, on the basis of the evidence before it, the proposed 
court would be found, as a determination of fact, to be a permitted in-
cidental use. On the argument that the fences to be built around the 
tennis court were "structures," the Court did not have to rule,S since 
it found that the petitioners had no interest that would be supported 
or advanced by a judgment that a building permit was required for 
the fences. The petitioners' only interest was to secure a ruling by 
the local board of appeals that a tennis court was not permitted on 
this residential property. 
Costa v. Board of Appeals of Watertown4 held that use of land for a 
motel was not permitted in a general residence district under a zoning 
by-law permitting "lodging houses_" The by-law included this defi-
nition: "Hotel or lodging house: A building designed or used for 
paying guests, permanently or transiently, where more than three bed-
rooms are used for such purposes." There was no other mention of 
hotels in the by-law and none of motels. The Court held that there 
was no intent in the zoning by-law to permit motels to be built in 
residence districts; the ambiguous and confusing definition, and the 
possible analogizing of motels to hotels, cannot in any way be con-
strued to imply an authorization to build a motel in a general residence 
district. 
In Dodge v. Inspector of Buildings of Newburyport5 the city had 
adopted a zoning ordinance provision permitting the front room of 
a house located in a residence district to "be used by the owner or 
occupant ... as a small store for the sale of food, clothing or small 
wares." The owner of a house remodelled it so that the entire first 
floor, except for the kitchen and back porch, was one room, and con-
ducted a drug store in this large section of the first floor of the home. 
The Court found obvious violations of the zoning ordinance in both 
the space used and the business done. The "front room" provision 
did not include gutting most of the interior of a building to make it 
21960 Mass. Adv. Sh. 895,168 N.E.2d 257. 
3 The petitioners had argued that a fence was a structure under G.L., c. 143. §1. 
by effect of the amendment made by Acts of 1945. c. 480. The Court stated that 
it would be disinclined to require a building permit under the local by-law on the 
basis of this statutory definition, particularly as it was enacted after adoption of 
the by-law. 
4340 Mass. 380.164 N.E.2d 149 (1960). 
15 340 Mass. 382, 164 N.E.2d 309 (1960). 
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into one room, and the business did not involve only the sale of food, 
clothing, or small wares. 
In Kurz v. Board of Appeals of North Reading6 the landowner con-
ducted a dance studio as well as resided on· property zoned for resi-
dential use. Her request for a building permit to increase the size of 
her dance studio facilities was denied by the inspector of buildings 
and the board of appeals. The zoning by-law permits residentially 
zoned land to be used for educational purposes, but the Supreme Ju-
dicial Court concurred with the local authorities that a dance studio 
was not an educational use within the meaning of the by-law. It 
agreed with the finding below that the dance studio was a commercial 
enterprise operated for personal profit. 
In Maki v. Town of Yarmouth 7 the Supreme Judicial Court had 
again before it the same property as was involved in the 1958 case of 
Todd v. Board of Appeals of Yarmouth.8 The local zoning by-law per-
mits business districts, the depth of the district being the depth of lots 
at the date of adoption of the by-law, but limited to a maximum 
depth of 1200 feet. The draftsman indicated these business districts 
on the zoning map of the town by red lines along the streets where 
business use is permitted and vertical lines at right angles to the street 
lines to indicate ends of the zones. These red lines included the Bass 
River frontage upon which the locus here involved was located, and 
the owner now claims that this indicates that his property is in a busi-
ness district. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the lower court 
decision that this red line along the Bass River was not a line meant 
to indicate business zone frontage but was one of the lines at right 
angles to the frontage lines designed to indicate the ends of the busi-
ness zones. This was supported by the position of other lines on the 
map as well as the fact that the locus had no frontage on any street. 
The Court also agreed with the lower court's determination that the 
Todd case had settled the issue of permits granted in 1954 and 1955 
and that they were no longer applicable to the property. 
§13.6. Zoning: Procedure. Two cases decided by the Supreme 
Judicial Court during the 1960 SURVEY year involved interesting points 
of procedure in zoning cases. In Williams v. Inspector of Buildings of 
Belmont,! the petitioners brought mandamus against the building 
inspector to require him to forbid the construction of a tennis court 
on property adjacent to theirs. The Court found that mandamus was 
properly brought, since neither the enabling act2 nor the town by-law 
61960 Mass. Adv. Sh. 807,167 N.E.2d 627. 
7340 Mass. 207, 163 N.E.2d 633 (1960). 
8337 Mass. 162, 148 N.E.2d 380 (1958), discussed in 1958 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law 
§14.1. 
§13.6. 11960 Mass. Adv. Sh. 895, 168 N.E.2d 257. The issue of an action of 
mandamus was also discussed in Dodge v. Inspector of Buildings of Newburyport, 
340 Mass. 382, 164 N.E.2d 309 (1960). The substantive law aspects of both the 
Williams and Dodge cases are noted in §13.5 supra. 
2 G.L., c. 40A, §13. 
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gives a right of appeal to the local board of appeals except from an 
order or decision. The Court noted that it may seem arbitrary that 
questions of enforcement of the local zoning law will come before the 
board of appeals if a permit is granted or denied but will not if no 
permit is sought and the enforcing officer does not act. The local 
by-law could, however, be amended so that an appealable decision 
would be created in this situation. 
In Smith v. Board of Appeals of Plymouth3 the plaintiffs, owners 
of land in Plymouth, sought injunctions against the local board of 
appeals, the clerk of the board, and owners of property adjacent to 
theirs, which apparently was being used for purposes not permitted 
under the zoning by-law. The plaintiffs had previously successfully 
maintained an action of mandamus against the town selectmen, re-
quiring them to enforce the zoning by-law on the locus; the owners 
of the locus were intervenors in the mandamus action.4 The owners 
of the locus have recently sought several variances and permits to use 
their land for uses that are not permitted under the zoning by-law and 
that were involved in the action of mandamus.5 The lower court's 
decision sustaining demurrers of the defendants in the present action 
was affirmed by the Supreme Judicial Court. No equitable right was 
stated against the board of appeals, since the exclusive remedy of a 
person aggrieved by a board decision is the statutory right of appeal to 
the Superior Court. While, in certain circumstances, presumahly in-
cluding vexatious litigation, equitable relief could be granted against 
a landowner so litigating, a suit against a board of appeals would 
have to be ancillary to the primary action against the landowner to 
enjoin his applying to the board. No facts in this case indicate that 
the landowners abused their rights in applying for permits to the 
board. 
The plaintiffs relied extensively upon Colabufalo v. Public Buildings 
Commissioner of Newton6 in their action against the owners of the 
locus. The Court held the Colabufalo case inapplicable, carefully 
pointing out that the language of the case merely stated that the 
Superior Court has the undoubted equitable power to enjoin a viola-
tion of a zoning law;7 the language does not mean that private persons 
who have prevailed in mandamus can then institute a new equity 
action, even though enforcing officers may probably initiate proceed-
ings, ancillary to a mandamus case, against disobedient landowners 
who were intervenors in the mandamus proceeding and thus bound 
by the decree.8 The bill in the present case is not a petition, incidental 
3340 Mass. 230, 163 N.E.2d 654 (1960). 
4 There was no appeal to the Supreme Judicial Court in the mandamus proceed-
ings. Record, p. 2. 
I) One of the requests for permits was granted and the plaintiffs in this action 
have appealed as parties aggrieved to the Superior Court. Record, p. 3. 
6336 Mass. 205,143 N.E.2d 477 (1957), noted in 1957 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §11.2. 
7336 Mass. at 208-209,143 N.E.2d at 479. 
8 The Court inferred that such a suit by enforcing officers would probably be per-
mitted. 340 Mass. 230, 234, 163 N .E.2d 654, 657 (1960). 
10
Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law, Vol. 1960 [1960], Art. 16
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/asml/vol1960/iss1/16
140 1960 ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETTS LAW §13.7 
to the mandamus case, to bring into court landowners bound by the 
judgment. Since the mandamus action was brought against the select-
men, they were necessary parties to any later action to enforce the 
mandamus judgment; a petition against the landowners would be 
merely ancillary to the primary suit against the selectmen. 
§13.7. Subdivision control. A local planning board must approve 
a subdivision plan if it provides suitable ways for access, furnished 
with appropriate municipal utilities, and secure sanitary conditions.1 
Despite the 1953 revision of the Subdivision Control Law,2 which was 
expressly designed to clarify the purposes for which subdivision plans 
could be disapproved,s some planning boards have exceeded their 
authority and denied approval to plans that met the established stand-
ards. Planning boards seem often to use their disapproval power in 
an attempt to remedy deficiencies in the local zoning by-law. Many 
towns in the state, of course, have out-of-date and otherwise inadequate 
zoning laws. With population increases these inadequacies become ob-
vious; local facilities cannot meet the new demands put upon them 
and the character of the town is changed in ways not desired by the 
older residents.4 Cases involving illegal disapproval of subdivision 
plans have not been numerous before the Supreme Judicial Court, in 
large part because those interested have sought legislative rather than 
judicial relief. Ii Two cases involving the application of illegal sub-
division control standards were decided, however, by the Court during 
the 1960 SURVEY year. 
In Daley Construction Co., Inc. v. Planning Board of Randolph6 the 
Court decided that a subdivision plan could not be disapproved be-
cause of a shortage of water in the town with resultant low water pres-
sure and fire danger, and the fact that the proposed subdivision would 
increase the problems and dangers. The planning board apparently 
relied upon Section 81M of the enabling act, the general statement of 
legislative purpose, and principally those provisions relating to safety 
in case of fire and adequate provision for water in the proposed 
subdivision. The Court, not having earlier judicial decisions on this 
point to consider, relied entirely upon the language of the section and 
the legislative history of the section and the entire 1953 act.7 These 
indicated that Section 81M did not give planning boards free rein to 
determine if the mentioned factors are involved but merely detail the 
§I!1.7. 1 See 1953 House Doc. No. 2249, p. 54, quoted by the Court in Daley Con· 
struction Co. v. Planning Board of Randolph, 340 Mass. 149, 153·154, 163 N.E.2d 27, 
29 (1959). 
2 G.L., c. 41, §§81K·81GG. 
a See House Doc. No. 2249, pp. 10·12, quoted by the Court in Daley Construction 
Co. v. Planning Board of Randolph, 340 Mass. 149, 153·154, 163 N.E.2d 27, 29 (1959). 
4 Of course, not all undesired changes in a municipality can be controlled by 
zoning. See, e.g., 1959 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §12.10, discussing Acts of 1959, cc. 
221,607. 
5 See, e.g., comments and legislation discussed in 1959 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §12.11. 
is 340 Mass. 149, 163 N.E.2d 27 (1959). 
7 See 1953 House Doc. No. 2249, pp. 10·12,54. 
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principal considerations the board should consider in determining if 
the ways, municipal utilities, and sanitary conditions are adequate.s 
The Court noted that it did not have before it the issues of whether 
the municipality or local water company need furnish water to the 
subdivision, or whether, under Section SI U of the enabling act, the 
planning board may require that no land be sold or buildings con-
structed in the subdivision until the water pipe system is connected 
to an adequate water supply. 
Pieper v. Planning Board of Southborough9 also in part involved the 
same general issue as the Daley Construction Co. case. The planning 
board disapproved a subdivision plan on grounds that the town was 
to be surveyed within the next six or seven months, that a master 
plan for the town would then be developed, and no further subdivision 
within the town would be permitted until the master plan was avail-
able. No issue existed as to the proposed plan's compliance with the 
requirements of the enabling act and the local board's rules and reg-
ulations. The Court noted that the legislative history of the enabling 
act indicated that planning boards were to be limited to determi-
nations of whether the plan complied with the applicable standards; 
other considerations of general public policy, no matter how well 
founded, cannot be decisional factors,1o Thus, of course, the present 
disapproval was beyond the board's power. 
The Pieper case also decided several interesting procedural questions 
under the Subdivision Control Law. The local board did not hold 
a public hearing on the plan, notified Pieper by unregistered letter, 
and did not file the formal certificate of its action with the town clerk.ll 
After Pieper had filed his bill in equity to seek a decree that his plan 
had been illegally disapproved, he requested a certificate from the town 
clerk that the board had not taken final action within forty-five days 
and that therefore the plan was approved as submitted,12 The clerk 
refused to give the certificate and Pieper then instituted a bill in 
equity against the clerk, which was joined with his earlier action 
against the board. 
The Court held that Sections SIT and SIU must be read together 
to require a public hearing, within the forty-five-day period before 
final action is taken on the plan. But failure to hold the hearing 
before disapproving the plan does not necessarily entitle Pieper's plan 
S These considerations may, in fact, be at least as important in guiding planning 
boards in the establishment of their rules and regulations as in guiding their de-
cisions relative to individual plans. 
9340 Mass. 157, 163 N.E.2d 14 (1959). 
10 The Court discussed the Daley Construction Co. case, supra note 6, and noted 
the legislative history discussed in that case. 
11 These requirements are set out in G.L., c. 41, §§8IT, 8IU. These sections have 
been amended since the decision in this case and the problem faced by the Court 
here was at least partly solved. See discussion of Acts of 1960, c. 266, in §13.l1 
infra. 
12 General Laws, c. 41, §§81 U, 8IBB, make approval of a subdivision plan auto-
matic if the Board has not acted on the proposed plan within forty-five days after 
its submission and a twenty-day appeal period. 
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to automatic approval under Section 81 U, at least if the other pro-
visions of that section are complied with; the improper disapproval is 
not to be treated as a nullity. The notification, even if not in accord-
ance with the statutory requirements, still was received by Pieper in 
this case. While the Court assumed that a somewhat formally authen-
ticated certificate of decision had to be filed with the town clerk, the 
issue presented on these facts is not whether a third person would be 
bound by the unsigned copy of the board's letter to Pieper, which was 
all that the board filed with the clerk. Pieper treated the letter from 
the board as a final disapproval by filing his bill against the board; 
further, he filed it within the forty-five day decision period, so that the 
informalities of the board's filing action might otherwise have been 
remedied within the statutory period. IS Since these informalities af-
fected only Pieper, he should not now be permitted to contend that 
the action of the board was not final when his bill in equity against 
the board is based upon the finality of the board action. 
The Court carefully limits its decision to the precise facts of the 
Pieper case. Particularly when other parties may have rights affected 
by board action, strict compliance with the procedural requirements 
may be essential to give constructive notice of board action. Con-
veyancers, too, must be able to rely upon the record. This limiting 
of the decision is vital. The procedural requirements are not diffi-
cult for the board to follow, nor are they generally a matter of ques-
tionable statutory construction.14 The rights of the public generally 
and of many private persons may be affected by a board decision and 
must be protected. The Court essentially analogizes the facts of the 
present case to general recording rules relating to interests in land; 
as between the parties the failure to record does not make the trans-
action invalid; as to other persons, constructive notice from the proper 
record of the interests in the land, or actual notice, is required if they 
are to be bound. Thus, as limited by the Court, the relaxation of 
procedural requirements permitted in the Pieper case seems reason-
able and has some precedent, although there are precedents to the 
contrary.15 The 1960 amendments of Sections 81T and 81U largely 
IS This argument of the Court, although weak, tends to buttress the conclusion 
reached upon consideration of the stronger arguments. 
14 The board did contend in the Pieper case that the statement in §81T that 
"[b]efore approval ... is given, a public hearing shall be held," meant the hearing 
would not be required except when a plan is approved. This argument was almost 
certainly not the basis of the board's original decision to hold no hearing, but was 
merely an argument brought into the case later to justify the action. A board that 
is well advised will, of course, comply with all apparent procedural formalities, 
even if a given requirement might arguably not be positively required. Thus, in 
the Pieper case, it seems certain that no lawyer would have advised the board to 
dispense with the public hearing upon such flimsy statutory grounds. This entire 
problem has been obviated by Acts of 1960, c. 266, which clarifies the provision to 
require a hearing before any board decision. See §13.l1 infra for a discussion of the 
amendment. 
15 In some licensing and zoning cases, for example, the Court has held that com-
pliance with procedural requirements, at least as relates to notice, goes to the juris-
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solve the problem faced by the Court in the Pieper case. The amend-
ment to Section SIT specifically requires a public hearing before dis-
approval and modification and approval, as well as before approval. 
Section SIU is amended to equate the board's failure to file the certifi-
cate of action with the clerk to its failure to act, and in both situations 
the plan is deemed approved.16 
§13.8. Urban redevelopment: "Public purpose." Problems in de-
veloping the Prudential center in Boston resulted in two Opinions of 
the Justices during the 1960 SURVEY year. In the earlier opinionl 
the Justices held that proposed legislation could not be constitution-
ally enacted since, on balance, private rather than public purposes 
prevailed in the proposal. The basis of the proposal was that the Back 
Bay area involved would be developed by the Massachusetts Turnpike 
Authority. The Court found that this proposal was essentially similar 
to the 1955 proposal, which involved the use of a city redevelopment 
commission as the development authority, and which the Justices had 
determined would not be valid.2 The Justices also found that, while 
the present project might be judged to be for a public purpose if it 
were expressed with sufficient definiteness, the inexactness of the pro-
posed statutory language made a determination of whether public pur-
poses predominated purely a speculative matter. In the later opinion,3 
the proposal was based upon amendments to the urban redevelop-
ment corporation law,4 in accordance with intimations in the earlier 
opinion that this approach might well be fruitful. The justices found 
this proposal to be constitutional, subject to certain limitations upon 
indefinite or overly broad statutory language. 
The major legal importance of these cases, outside of their revela-
tion that draftsmanship of major statutes still remains an art not much 
developed in the Commonwealth, lies in their discussion of "public 
purpose." Massachusetts limits public expenditures, the laying of 
taxes, and the exercise of the power of eminent domain through a 
gloss on the state constitution that requires that such government 
action be for a predominately public purpose. The difficulty in de-
diction. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Boston v. Board of Appeal of Boston, 268 
Mass. 416. 167 N.E. 672 (1929); d. White Fuel Corp v. Board of Street Commissioners 
of Boston. 289 Mass. 337, 194 N.E. 130 (1935) (notice adequate since given required 
number of days before actual hearing even though not before date originally set 
for hearing); Bradley v. Board of Zoning Adjustment of Boston. 255 Mass. 160. 172, 
150 N.E. 892. 897 (1926) (notice by mail requirement probably not met by service of 
notice by constable at last known place of abode). But see Morrison v. Selectmen 
of Weymouth. 279 Mass. 486. 490-491, 181 N.E. 786. 788 (1932) (actual notice and 
waiver of objections voided claim of lack of jurisdiction). 
16 Acts of 1960. c. 266, contains both amendments. See the discussion in §llI.ll 
infra. 
§ll1.8. 1 Opinion of the Justices. 1960 Mass. Adv. Sh. 7857i67N.E.2d~ 
2 Opinion of the Justices, lIlI2 Mass: 769, 126 N.E.2d 79if (m55). discussed in 1955 
Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §11.7. _____ .. ________ ~ 
3 Opinion of the Justices. 1960 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1029.~8 N.E.2d ~ 
4 G.L.. c. 121A. -------
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termining if this requirement has been met is revealed by the fact 
that about one third of all Opinions of the Justices decided since 1945 
have dealt completely or in major part with this issue.· The Justices 
have slowly, at least since about 1939,5 eroded the effects of the doc-
trine by a broader recognition of what constitutes public purpose, 
tending more toward equating it with public benefit. Thus, the 
earlier cases finding private purposes in aids to a segment of the pop-
ulation, or emphasizing the private rather than public purposes of a 
given statute, have gradually been replaced by cases recognizing, for 
example, aids for veterans' and aged persons' housing, slum clearance, 
and public parking operated by private interests as predominately 
public purposes.6 But even the more flexible attitude of the Justices 
today does not mean that the test has disappeared.7 The earlier Pru-
dential proposal that the Justices considered during the 1960 SURVEY 
year had, as the only positive public purpose, a garage in the center, 
which in time the Massachusetts Turnpike Authority would turn 
over to the city of Boston; statutory language authorizing but not re-
quiring a turnpike extension and a truck terminal, and referring to 
the proposed Boston municipal auditorium, could not be public pur-
poses since they were optional and might never be constructed. The· 
proposal required a large number of privately constructed buildings and 
gave the builder a tax benefit by computations based upon fixed sums 
for several years and then computed upon the basis of gross rentals. 
The private benefits thus far outweighed the relatively slight public 
benefit. The later proposal, discussed in the second opinion, was 
based, in a somewhat oversimplified analysis, upon the predominant 
public purpose of development of blighted areas, including open land, 
with adequate government approval of projects and continuing regu-
lation; private tax benefits were thus secondary.s Thus, after the 
Justices had indicated the proper way in which to arrive at the desired 
result, legislation that could constitutionally accomplish the objectives 
was drafted.D 
5 Probably the first case in which the Court strongly tended to distinguish the 
language and holdings of earlier cases was Allydonn Realty Corp. v. Holyoke Hous-
ing Authority, 304 Mass. 288,23 N.E.2d 665 (1939). See the excellent discussion of 
this and the preceding cases in Nichols, The Meaning of Public Purpose in the Law 
of Eminent Domain, 20 B.U.L. Rev. 615 (1940). Of course, the Court continues to 
use the earlier cases for theory and often, when facts are essentially indistinguish-
able, trea" the older cases as controlling. 
6 See Huber, Public Policy and the Eminent Domain Power, in Robbins; ed., 
State Government and Public Responsibility 27 (1960). 
7 Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 75 Sup. Ct. 98, 99 L. Ed. 27 (1954). has removed 
the public purpose doctrine completely as a federal constitutional test. 
8 The Justices did limit their approval by a statement that each project had to be 
determined to be for a public purpose on its own individual facts and merits. but 
their discussion of the Prudential center as a hypothetical situation under the pro-
posed statute indicated their belief that the center would be for a predominantly 
public purpose. 
D The proposed statute became law by Acts of 1960, c. 652, approved September 7. 
1960. 
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§13.9. Massachusetts Parking Authority. In Appleton v. Mas-
sachusetts Parking Authority! the Supreme Judicial Court upheld the 
authority's taking by eminent domain of two parcels of land for the 
Boston Common garage. The statute creating the authority provides 
that it may acquire land either through purchase or through a taking 
by eminent domain.2 Other provisions of the statute require that the 
city of Boston's parks and recreation commission and its council assent 
to conveyances of land to the authority.s The petitioners in the pres-
ent case argued that the city was thus given a veto power over the 
authority's taking of land for the garage. The Court reviewed the 
arguments for both the petitioners and the authority and decided 
that the legislative intent, despite the act's foggy wording and lack of 
integration, was that the city would not have veto power over the 
Boston Common parking project. The opinion is an extremely in-
teresting and persuasive determination of legislative intent from a 
statute that is, to be charitable, poorly drafted. Although the statute 
gave the Court an opportunity to produce an excellent opinion re-
quiring close analysis and balancing of statutory policies, this is not the 
major purpose of legislation. 
B. LEGISLATION 
§13.10. Zoning Enabling Act. The Zoning Enabling Act! was 
again the subject of amendment during the 1960 SURVEY year. Amend-
ments to this act generally have fitted into one of two categories. The 
first, to which there can be no real objection, sets out more adequate 
and detailed procedures to insure protection of interested parties and 
a more uniform practice. The second, sometimes objectionable, limits 
local control of zoning matters and thus interferes with the home 
rule aspects ordinarily favored in zoning. In fairness to the General 
Court, these limitations on local control have resulted from abuses 
by local authorities. If regional land use control is not to be set up, 
a form of state control of zoning by imposing severe limitations upon 
local authorities is inevitable and, to a marked extent, has already 
been achieved.2 
Section 7A of G.L., c. 40A, was amended by Acts of 1960, c. 291, to 
provide the same protection to subdivision plans that have been en-
dorsed "approval under the subdivision control law not required," 3 
as had been extended to approved definitive subdivisions under the 
section. The lots in such a plan, if it complied with the zoning law 
13.9. 1340 Mass. 303, 164 N.E.2d 1!17 (1960). 
2 Acts of 1958, c. 606, §5(k). 
3 Id. §§5(i), 7. 
§13.10. 1 G.L., c. 4OA. 
2 See, e.g., the amendments discussed in 1959 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §12.l0 and 
1958 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §14.9, as well as those discussed herein. 
S This is, in general, the endorsement prescribed by G.L., c. 41, §81P, a part of the 
Subdivision Control Law. 
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in effect at the time of the endorsement, will not be affected by any 
amendments to the local zoning law made within three years after the 
endorsement.4 The permitted uses on a lot, however, can be increased 
by zoning law changes to include uses other than those indicated on 
the original plan. The act provides further protection to subdividers 
from attempts by cities and towns to impose zoning changes that pre-
vent the economic development of land. 
Acts of 1960, c. 326, amended Section 18 of the enabling act to re-
quire that limited or conditional variances and special permits be re-
corded in the registry of deeds before they become effective. A notice 
certified by the chairman or clerk of the board of appeals, identifying 
the landowner and the property and stating that a variance or permit 
has been granted that is set forth in a decision filed with the city or 
town clerk, is to be recorded; the notice will be indexed in the grantor 
index under the owner's name. The act is designed to call the atten-
tion of conveyancers to the existence of special conditions that may be 
imposed by boards of appeals in granting variances and issuing permits. 
Apparently, only those variances that impose conditions need be re-
corded but, since all permits under the enabling act are "special per-
mits," 5 apparently all must be recorded even if they do not contain 
any conditions imposed upon the grant.6 
Acts of 1960, c. 365, amends Section 21 of the enabling act to set out 
in much greater detail the procedure for appeal by an aggrieved person 
or municipal officer or board from a decision of a board of appeals. 
The appeal is in the form of a bill in equity seeking to annul the 
decision as exceeding the authority of the board, the allegations to be 
made in detail. Notice, in lieu of regular service of process, must be 
given within fourteen days after filing of the bill to all of a listed 
group of respondents, and an affidavit of the petitioner stating that 
this notice has been given to all respondents must be filed with the 
clerk of the court within twenty-one days after entry of the bill. Fail-
ure to file the affidavit of notice within the prescribed period entails 
compulsory dismissal of the bill. Answers are not required but are 
permitted and interested persons can intervene. Other procedural de-
tails are set out, generally conforming to equity practice. 
§13.11. Subdivision Control Law. The usual numerous amend-
ments to the Subdivision Control Law1 were made during the 1960 
SURVEY year. Considering that the act was completely revised in 1953 
and has been extensively amended since, perhaps most of the act's 
substantive and procedural deficiencies have been removed. The num-
ber and extensiveness of the amendments that have been found to be 
necessary suggests, however, that a new study of the subject should be 
4 Acts of 1959, c. 221, noted in 1959 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §12.1O, also extended 
this protection to subdividers after submission of their preliminary plans. 
II General Laws, c. 40A, §4, so denominates all permits for exceptions. 
8 See Report of the Legislative Committee of the Massachusetts Conveyancers' As-
sociation for 1960, p. 1. 
§13.l1. 1 G.L., c. 41, §§81K.81GG. 
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made. A study may result in a determination that a new act is neces-
sary or that an integrated series of amendments should be adopted. 
While changes are inevitable in a developing field of law, they should 
not be accomplished by ad hoc amendments; the General Court should 
conduct a continual review of the legislation to insure that amend-
ments and changes are coordinated and that the statute accomplishes 
the desired results. 
Section 81P of the Subdivision Control Law, governing approval of 
plans not subject to the control law, was amended by Acts of 1960, c. 
197. The planning board must now give written notice to an appli-
cant if it determines that his plan requires approval. The subdivider's 
appeal under Section 81BB must be brought within fifteen days after 
he receives notice of the board's determination. 
Section 81Q of G.L., c. 4l,2 was twice amended during the 1960 
SURVEY year. Acts of 1960, c. 417, adds the requirement that the rules 
and regulations of the planning board shall not require referrals of a 
subdivision plan to any other person or board prior to its submission 
to the planning board. The legislation is designed to correct local 
procedure in a number of municipalities in which the planning board 
has required approval by certain town officials, generally the water 
commissioner and the town engineer, before it will accept the plan 
for consideration. The planning boards involved have generally fol-
lowed this procedure because they have not set out, in their rules and 
regulations, standards required for an approved subdivision with either 
the required clarity or detail. The act should encourage boards to rec-
tify this deficiency in their rules and regulations, and thus remove an 
element of uncertainty this practice has unfairly created for subdi-
viders. 
Acts of 1960, c. 196, amends Section 81 Q by removing the reference 
to a forty-five day limit for final action by the planning board and 
stating that the time limit is as prescribed in Section 81 U. This 
amendment makes the changes necessary to conform Section 81Q 
with section 81U, which was adopted in its present amended form 
two years ago, by Acts of 1958, c. 206. 
Acts of 1960, c. 266, amends Section 81Ts to clarify that section 
that, prior to the amendment, required a public hearing before ap-
proval of a definitive plan; the amendment requires a hearing before 
disapproval, or modification and approval, as well as approval of the 
plan. This clarifies statutory language that has been argued to require 
a public hearing only when a plan is to be approved. The Supreme 
Judicial Court had, however, required planning boards to hold a hear-
ing before taking any action;4 thus, this amendment merely clarifies 
2 Section SIQ governs the adoption of rules and regulations by the planning 
board. 
s Section SIT governs notice and hearings requirements after submission of sub-
division plans. 
4 Pieper v. Planning Board of Southborough, 340 Mass. 157, 163 N.E.2d 14 (1959), 
discussed in §13.7 supra. 
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the statutory language so that it will conform to the interpretation 
given it by the Court. 
Section 81U of G.L., c. 41,5 was twice amended during the 1960 SUR-
VEY year. The section had stated that failure of the planning board to 
take final action within sixty days, or the time as extended by agree-
ment, is deemed to be approval of the definitive plan. In the recent 
case of Pieper v. Planning Board of Southborough,6 the Supreme Ju-
dicial Court held that failure of the board to file a formal certificate 
of its action with the town clerk did not require automatic approval 
under Section 81 U. Acts of 1960, c. 266, apparently reverses this hold-
ing of the Court by amending the section to include a provision that 
failure to file the certificate of action is to be deemed an approval of 
the plan. The actual decision in the Pieper case involved the filing 
with the clerk of a copy of the letter of decision and thus the question 
may be presented under this amendment if the certificate filed with the 
clerk need be of a formal nature to prevent this section from giving 
automatic approval. Reasonably the amendment should be read to 
require a formal certificate, and failure to file it should constitute 
approval. As has been noted earlier in this chapter a conflict of poli-
cies exists as to this problem;7 probably it is more important that it be 
settled than that itbe decided one way or the other. 
Section 81 U was also amended by Acts of 1960, c. 153. The act re-
quires a planning board to indicate in detail all particulars in which 
a disapproved plan does not meet its standards and the recommenda-
tions of the health officer or board. It the plan is amended to comply 
with the standards listed as not met on the first submission, the board 
must revoke its disapproval and approve the plan as modified. The 
amendment remedies a practice of some planning boards to disapprove 
a plan, mentioning only one of several standards that the plan does 
not meet. This results either in discouraging the subdivider from 
further submission or, in most cases, in requiring a number of resub-
missions. Of course, if a board's rules and regulations set out its stand-
ards fully, a subdivider should be able to comply with them on his 
first submission of a definitive plan, at least if he submitted a pre-
liminary plan for consideration by the health and planning boards; 
the act will thus also have the effect of encouraging the boards to set 
up adequate rules and regulations. 
Acts of 1960, c. 189, corrects an obvious deficiency in section 8lX8 
of the Subdivision Control Law. The section has permitted the regis-
ter of deeds to record only those plans that the planning board had 
approved, had certified did not need approval, or, because of the 
board's failure to act, were deemed approved. In the subsection 
covering recording of board-approved plans, the clerk of the city or 
5 Section 81 U governs the decision of the planning board on subdivision plans 
submitted to them and sets out prerequisites for decision. 
6340 Mass. 157. 163 N.E.2d 14 (1959). 
7 See §13.7 supra. 
8 Section 81X states the requirements for registration of subdivision plans. 
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town was required to certify that no appeal had been taken. Thus, 
if an appeal had been taken, even though the plan was approved, strict 
reading of the subsection forbade recording. This has been remedied 
by adding a phrase that, in case appeal is taken, the clerk will certify 
that the final decree of the court sustained the boards' approval of the 
plan. 
Section 81AA of the law was amended by Acts of 1960, c. 198, setting 
out much more extensive notice requirements relating to hearings be-
fore boards of appeals in relation to subdivision control matters. 
§13.12. Minimum housing standards. Acts of 1960, c. 172, amends 
G.L., c. Ill, to set out in greater detail the remedies available to local 
boards of health in case a structure fails to comply with the sanitary 
code provisions relating to human habitation. A new paragraph added 
to Section 5 permits demolition, removal, repair, or cleaning of such a 
structure, expense incurred to be a debt of the owner. Section 128D is 
amended by inserting a requirement of written notice to any mort-
gagee of record of the building held to be uninhabitable. If such a 
building is ordered closed up and the deficiencies are not remedied 
within a year, the board of health may have the structure demolished 
or removed at the owner's expense. The debt constitutes a lien on the 
land and detailed recording and enforcement provisions are now set 
out. 
§13.13. Historic districts. Acts of 1960, c. 372, adds a new Chap-
ter 40C to the General Laws. The statute sets up an historic district 
enabling act. The new law governs the procedure for setting up an 
historic district, the control imposed over changes in buildings within 
the district, with provisions requiring a certificate of appropriateness, 
and the variance procedure. The creation of these historic districts 
will aid in the task of preserving the appropriate atmosphere for some 
of the old sections of the Commonwealth's cities and towns. While a 
district, once adopted, may extensively restrict a landowner's right to 
use his land freely, it appears that limitations in setting up districts 
will avoid the likelihood of their being set up only secondarily for 
historical reasons and primarily for restrictive purposes not attainable 
under zoning and subdivision control. This danger' could develop, 
however, and it appears that some agency other than local authority 
should participate in the actual decisional process to set up the dis-
trict; the present consultive status of several agencies does not give 
any control. Under principles of home rule, however, any state agency 
participation in decisions should be limited to preventing the use of 
the law to circumvent restrictions of other land use control laws. 
Acts of 1960, c. 345, sets up an Historic Districts Commission for 
the town of Concord and defines its powers and duties. 
§13.14. Miscellaneous legislation. A number of acts adopted dur-
ing the 1960 SURVEY year affect land use and control but will only be 
noted here briefly, either because the change involved is slight or be-
cause, while important, it affects only a small group of persons inter-
ested in land use control. 
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Acts of 1960, c. 542, amends Section 26W of G.L., c. 121, governing 
state guarantees and contributions for housing of elderly persons. 
The amounts guaranteed and contributed are substantially increased, 
and provision is made for an additional annual contribution. 
Acts of 1960, c. 517, adds a new section to G.L., c. 132A, requiring 
the commissioner of natural resources to set up a program to assist 
towns and cities with conservation commissions. Under the act the 
commissioner may reimburse a city or town for part of the expense 
in establishing an approved conservation project. 
Acts of 1960, c. 596, directs the board of schoolhouse structural 
standards, until late 1961, and the commissioner of public safety, after 
that time, to establish standards for the construction of public and 
private schoolhouses. . 
Acts of 1960, c. 355, requires the owners of residential land in Bos-
ton, unless they live thereon, to keep on file information on land own-
ership and location with the building commissioner. The act is de-
signed to avoid the difficulty the city has experienced with overdue tax 
collections and enforcement of building codes and health standards. 
Acts of 1960, c. 279, amends Acts of 1945, c. 74, governing the manner 
in which local government units can secure the benefits granted by 
federal law to assist public works projects. The amendment permits 
the local units involved to accept advances of federal funds for surveys 
and plan preparation, and validates such action taken by these units 
prior to the adoption of this amendment. 
§13.15. Urban renewal. The Special Commission on Audit of 
State Needs published its report on Massachusetts needs in urban and 
industrial renewal, as 1960 House Doc. No. 3373, during the 1960 
SURVEY year. The report should be studied by all those interested 
in land use; everyone may not agree with the commission's recom-
mendations, but the report gives an excellent picture of Massachusetts 
achievements and deficiencies in the urban renewal area. The report 
recommends the establishment of a Division of Urban and Industrial 
Renewal, the creation of an interdepartmental coordinating committee 
on urban renewal and regional planning, state financial aid for urban 
renewal, the liberalization of the municipal debt limit for urban re-
newal, and coordinated local, regional and state planning. 
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